Repression of Communication and Digital Rights Situation in Myanmar
Forbidding Social Media and Internet Websites
Three days after the military’s attempted coup in 2021, on the 3rd of February, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication issued an order to close news media and internet websites, social media applications, and its platforms, including the Facebook social network, temporarily. Moreover, in July 2024, they curbed the usage of “Signal”, the privacy-focused and end-to-end encrypted application, which was significantly used in the country. The Signal SMS system is well-designed and serves as a secure platform for resistance groups, strike leaders and activists, as it could prevent the surveillance and watchful eyes of the military.
The banning of Signal has narrowed secure options for sharing messages and information among the public. Concerning the ban on the Signal, [Ma] Wai Phyo Myint, the Asia Pacific Policy Analyst of Access Now, gave her remark as follows (မိအိသဥ္ဇာမြင့် 2024၊ July 20):
“Signal makes intrusive surveillance of the military impossible. So, they cannot track down communications on the app. Therefore, it can be said that they banned Signal because they didn’t want a secure communication channel that the public could use.”
Concurrently, the military tried substituting the popular and widely used Facebook and YouTube with the social media platforms that they have developed, such as My Space Myanmar, Okay Par, and Mtube, but their attempts ended in vain (DVB 2024: June 4; RFA Burmese 2022: September 9). They aimed to make the populace widely use their social media networks, where VPNs are not needed, whereas they blocked the usage of VPNs among the public. Besides, despite their efforts to upload their propaganda tools, MRTV software, on the Google Play Store and App Store, it was constantly discarded.
Concurrently, the military tried substituting the popular and widely used Facebook and YouTube with the social media platforms that they have developed, such as My Space Myanmar, Okay Par, and Mtube, but their attempts ended in vain (DVB 2024: June 4; RFA Burmese 2022: September 9). They aimed to make the populace widely use their social media networks, where VPNs are not needed, whereas they blocked the usage of VPNs among the public. Besides, despite their efforts to upload their propaganda tools, MRTV software, on the Google Play Store and App Store, it was constantly discarded.
The military formed an Online Surveillance Committee with 11 members, including representatives at the National Deputy General level, to monitor the usage of online media platforms systematically in the second week of December 2023 (RFA Burmese 2024: January 24). As a result of these intentional and oppressive actions to systematically limit internet freedom and digital rights, Myanmar ranked second worst on freedom on the Net 2024 report published by Freedom House in October 2024 (Freedom House 2024: October 16).
Banning of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and Arresting VPN Users
As mentioned above, after forming an online surveillance committee at the end of 2023, the military accelerated the suppression of digital rights in 2024. This suppression includes curbing VPN software to bypass banned internet sites and social media since May 2024 (BBC Burmese 2024: June 6). The military fines people when they discover VPN software on their mobile phones and arrests them on a nationwide scale (Irrawaddy 2024 June 15).
Those detentions can be seen in big cities like Yangon and Mandalay. Likewise, in cities such as Bago, Magway, Sagaing, Irrawaddy, Chin, and Shan State, there were cases of the military’s police and soldiers setting up security gates, frequently checking the people, and arresting them in prison (RFA Burmese 2024: June 13). For example, at least 25 civilians were put behind bars in the Irrawaddy Region alone in May and June of the early stages of the VPN ban (Grant Peck 2024: June 15). A local media outlet, Myae Latt Athan, also features the news of two men in the Zigon township of the Bago region who got arrested for discovering VPN software ( on their phone) in the surprise check of the police (ခန့်အောင် 2024: June 14).
The military threatens and fines the people unjustly, besides putting the VPN users behind bars. According to one local news outlet, on the 12th of June 2024, the soldiers of the military threatened the man in their discovery of VPN software on his phone, and he had to give one lakh in Myanmar Kyats (လူထုနွေဦး 2024: June 13). On a similar note, in Malamyaing Kyun of the Irrawaddy Region, the military ‘s security forces threatened at least five civilians. to give up to three lakhs and four lakhs in June when the military found out the use of VPN on their mobile phones (RFA Burmese 2024: June 13).
The expose of the local news reports that the military is drafting the cyber-security law with the clause “No one shall be access to a network using Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology or similar technology on a network licensed under the Telecommunications Law without the permission of the Ministry. If convicted of using the offense, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for a minimum of one year and a maximum of three years or with a fine not exceeding 50 lakhs kyats or both” (အောင်ဇေ 2024: June 19)။ Those actions indicate that the military is systematically controlling the flow of information among the public, the freedom of the internet, and digital rights.
Establishing Online Surveillance Mechanisms to Control Public’s Movements
With the aim of more control on tracking the activities of the people and the resistance groups, in the last few years, in place of the registration cards, the military introduced smart cards that can systemically store biometric data (နန်းလောဝ် 2024: May 22). As the first step, they stored the information on the registration cards in the immigration computer. They issue a Unique Identification Number (UID) when all the data is correct. In the early stages, the public did not get the UID cards for fear of security concerns and the consequences of the system (DVB 2024: April 4). Yet, the military threatens, and they do not issue the passports to the people without those smart cards. Moreover, the military inquired (more than necessary) and forced the public to use UID cards during domestic travels. Eventually, more people had to give in and get UID cards. Additionally, the military connected the biometric data from the AI-powered CCTV camera and those smart cards to track people’s activities and resistance movements.
They detained the suspected civilians by tracking the IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) and IP (Internet Protocol) addresses of phone SIM cards through online transactions via KBZ Pay, AYA Pay, and Wave Money mobile applications. Moreover, those associated with these banking services have been sentenced under the Anti-Terrorism Law 50(J) and 52(A) (မိုးသောက် 2023: October 23). They closed the bank accounts of suspected individuals during the early period. However, they intentionally kept the bank accounts and online banking services active to closely monitor and track the accounts of those affiliated with them rather than closing these accounts later. They detained the exposed individuals along with the monitored account holders after a period of observation.