



Repression of Communication and Digital Rights situation in Myanmar

December 2024

Athan

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Background History of Athan - Freedom of Expression Activist Organization

Athan – a non-profit organization for the Freedom of Expression Movement in Myanmar, was founded by youth activists on 15th January 2018 and intends to ensure the right to freedom of expression to practice in society.

Athan, a research-based organization, was established by combining two organizations, (RTTL) Research Team for Telecommunications Laws and (WSJ) We Support Journalists, to promote Freedom of Expression with three core approaches – research, advocacy, and awareness-raising. Our organization continuously researches and investigates laws, customs, regulations, and case studies that oppress freedom of expression and works on legal reform according to democracy standards, campaigns, and lobbying to achieve a broader level of freedom of expression in respective country categories based on our research and investigation.

Athan and its founder, Maung Saungkha, earned the Human Rights Tulip Award from the Netherlands in December 2018. Athan's ambition for Myanmar is to become a society with complete freedom of expression, which is one of the democratic standards.

1. Introduction

The military junta has increased its efforts to suppress the internet, communication, and digital rights, including freedom of expression, through a systemic use of technology. In 2024, . This suppression encompasses social media usage, disseminating information on social media, and voicing opinions on politics and other issues on the internet. International telecommunication companies such as Telenor (now known as Atom) and Ooredoo have already fallen into the hands of the military or its pro-military cronies and have been entirely controlled by them.

Through systematic control of all the possible means of communication, the military is trying to dismantle resistance groups and people's engagement in revolutionary activities. In doing so, they have heavily restricted internet freedom by blocking internet websites, social media, and online platforms, limiting the virtual private networks (VPNs) that can bypass banned websites. Furthermore, they even arrest VPN users when they discover the usage of those forbidden software on people's mobile devices. Moreover, online bank transactions are also closely monitored by the military to prevent financial flows and support toward resistance movements.

Notably, there have been cases of the military tracking suspicious social media and bank accounts and taking action against these account users through their surveillance mechanisms, units, and advanced cyber technologies to curb the public's movement against its regime.

Hence, this short analysis report will mainly focus on the following questions: "In which regions of Myanmar are the internet and communication shut down? And in which way is the military strategizing to control the people's resistance movements by suppressing internet freedom and digital rights, including freedom of expression?"

2. Methodology

The current short analysis report is based on verified data and information collected through Athan's systematic daily news monitoring and documentation of communication shutdowns, internet freedom, and digital rights restrictions.

We systematically gathered information from local-based international media organizations, exiled Myanmar media organizations, and local media at the provincial and township levels. When additional verification is needed, Athan contacts partner organizations and local networks to verify and add more detailed information.

In monitoring the cases of communication blackouts in Myanmar, we collected cases of communication blackouts as an entire region when there were one (or) more than one incident of internet and communication shutdown from telecommunication operators operating in Myanmar, such as Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), Ooredoo, Atom, and MyTel.

Since news media almost mainly covers the cases of communication blackouts rather than the cases of communication restoration in each region, one research limitation we encountered in drafting this report was that we could not provide comprehensive information on townships and areas that have access to the internet and communication. Therefore, this report is mainly concerned with communication blackouts and the patterns of how these blackouts were carried out.

3. Forbidding Social Media and Internet Websites

Three days after the military's attempted coup in 2021, on the 3rd of February, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication issued an order to close news media and internet websites, social media applications, and its platforms, including the Facebook social network, temporarily. Moreover, in July 2024, they curbed the usage of "Signal", the privacy-

focused and end-to-end encrypted application, which was significantly used in the country. The Signal SMS system is well-designed and serves as a secure platform for resistance groups, strike leaders, and activists, as it could prevent the surveillance and watchful eyes of the military .

The banning of Signal has narrowed secure options for sharing messages and information among the public. Concerning the ban on the Signal, [Ma] Wai Phyo Myint, the Asia Pacific Policy Analyst of Access Now, gave her remark as follows ([မိအိသဉ္ဇာမြင့်](#) 2024: July 20)¹:

“Signal makes intrusive surveillance of the military impossible. So, they cannot track down communications on the app. Therefore, it can be said that they banned Signal because they didn’t want a secure communication channel that the public could use.”

Concurrently, the military tried substituting the popular and widely used Facebook and YouTube with the social media platforms that they have developed, such as My Space Myanmar, Okay Par, and Mtube, but their attempts ended in vain ([DVB](#) 2024: June 4; [RFA Burmese](#) 2022: September 9²). They aimed to make the populace widely use their social media networks, where VPNs are not needed, whereas they blocked the usage of VPNs among the public. Besides, despite their efforts to upload their propaganda tools, MRTV software, on the Google Play Store and App Store, it was constantly discarded.

The military formed an Online Surveillance Committee with 11 members, including representatives at the National Deputy General level, to monitor the usage of online media platforms systematically in the second week of December 2023 ([RFA Burmese](#) 2024: January 24)³. As a result of these intentional and oppressive actions to systematically limit internet

¹ မိအိသဉ္ဇာမြင့် (2024: July 20) “ဆင်ဂဲလ်ပိတ်လိုက်ခြင်းကြောင့် ပြည်သူတို့ဆက်သွယ်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်း ပိုခက်ခဲလာ” <https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2024/07/20/387392.html>

² RFA Burmese (2022: September 9) “Facebook နဲ့ YouTube ကို အစားထိုးဖို့ စစ်ကောင်စီရဲ့ ကြိုးပမ်းချက် မအောင်မြင်နိုင်” https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/military-is-trying-to-replace-youtube-with-mtube

³ RFA Burmese (2024: January 24) “စစ်ကောင်စီရဲ့ အင်တာနက်စောင့်ကြည့်ကော်မတီဟာ ပိုမိုမိန့်ပိတ်ဖို့လို့ သုံးသပ်နေကြ” https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/military-internet-monitoring-committee-01242024013709.html

freedom and digital rights, Myanmar ranked second worst on freedom on the Net 2024 report published by Freedom House in October 2024 ([Freedom House](#) 2024: October 16)⁴.

4. Banning of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and Arresting VPN Users

As mentioned above, after forming an online surveillance committee at the end of 2023, the military accelerated the suppression of digital rights in 2024. This suppression includes curbing VPN software to bypass banned internet sites and social media since May 2024 ([BBC Burmese](#) 2024: June 6)⁵. The military fines people when they discover VPN software on their mobile phones and arrests them on a nationwide scale ([Irrawaddy](#) 2024 June 15)⁶.

Those detentions can be seen in big cities like Yangon and Mandalay. Likewise, in cities such as Bago, Magway, Sagaing, Irrawaddy, Chin, and Shan State, there were cases of the military's police and soldiers setting up security gates, frequently checking the people, and arresting them in prison ([RFA Burmese](#) 2024: June 13)⁷. For example, at least 25 civilians were put behind bars in the Irrawaddy Region alone in May and June of the early stages of the VPN ban ([Grant Peck](#) 2024: June 15)⁸. A local media outlet, Myae Latt Athan, also features the news of two men in the Zigon township of the Bago region who got arrested for discovering VPN software (on their phone) in the surprise check of the police ([ခန့်အောင်](#) 2024: June 14)⁹.

The military threatens and fines the people unjustly, besides putting the VPN users behind bars. According to one local news outlet, on the 12th of June 2024, the soldiers of the

⁴ Freedom House (2024, October 16) "Internet Freedom in the Asia-Pacific Region Declined in 2024" <https://freedomhouse.org/article/fotn-2024-asia-pacific-release>

⁵ BBC Burmese (2024, June 6) "VPN ကို စစ်ကောင်စီပိတ်လို့ ရနိုင်လား" <https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/c3ggzz48pdyo>

⁶ Irrawaddy (2024, June 15) "အရှုံးမီးငိုင်း စစ်ကောင်စီက သတင်းစီးဆင်းမှု ရပ်ရန် VPN များကို လိုက်ပိတ်" <https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2024/06/15/385301>

⁷ RFA Burmese (2024, June 13) "VPN အသုံးပြုမှုအပေါ် စစ်ကောင်စီ ထပ်မံတင်းကျပ်" https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/vpn-internet-online-06132024055704

⁸ Grant Peck (2024, June 15) "Myanmar's embattled military government cracks down on free flow of news by blocking VPNs" <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-censorship-virtual-private-network-facebook>

⁹ ခန့်အောင် (2024, June 14) "ဖုန်းထဲမှာ VPN တွေ့လို့ အမျိုးသား ၂ ဦးကို စစ်ကောင်စီဖမ်းဆီး" https://www.myaelattathan.org/articles/ဖုန်းထဲမှာVPNတွေ့လို့_အမျိုးသား_၂ဦးကို_စစ်ကောင်စီဖမ်းဆီး

military threatened the man in their discovery of VPN software on his phone, and he had to give one lakh in Myanmar Kyats (လူထုနေ့ဦး 2024: June 13)¹⁰. On a similar note, in Malamyang Kyun of the Irrawaddy Region, the military 's security forces threatened at least five civilians. to give up to three lakhs and four lakhs in June when the military found out the use of VPN on their mobile phones (RFA Burmese 2024: June 13)¹¹.

The expose of the local news reports that the military is drafting the cyber-security law with the clause “No one shall be access to a network using Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology or similar technology on a network licensed under the Telecommunications Law without the permission of the Ministry. If convicted of using the offense, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for a minimum of one year and a maximum of three years or with a fine not exceeding 50 lakhs kyats or both” (အောင်ဇေ 2024: June 19)¹² Those actions indicate that the military is systematically controlling the flow of information among the public, the freedom of the internet, and digital rights.

5. Establishing Online Surveillance Mechanisms to Control Public’s Movements

With the aim of more control on tracking the activities of the people and the resistance groups, in the last few years, in place of the registration cards, the military introduced smart cards that can systemically store biometric data (နန်းလောင် 2024: May 22)¹³. As the first step, they stored the information on the registration cards in the immigration computer. They issue a Unique Identification Number (UID) when all the data is correct. In the early stages, the

¹⁰ လူထုနေ့ဦး (2024, June 13) “မန္တလေးမှာ VPN အသုံးပြုမှုရှိမရှိ လမ်းသွားလမ်းလာတွေကို စစ်ဆေးမှုတွေရှိလာ” <https://www.ludunwayoo.com/news-mm/2024/06/13/92298/>
¹¹ RFA Burmese (2024, June 13) “ဖုန်းမှာ VPN တွေ့လို့ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ငွေကြေးတောင်းခံမှုတွေရှိလာ” <https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/vpn-internet-facebook-06132024033612.html>
¹² အောင်ဇေ (2024, June 19) “VPN အကြောင်းပြ ငွေညှစ်သည့်မီးပွား နေပြည်တော်အထိ ကူးလာ” <https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/53499/>
¹³ နန်းလောင် (2024, May 22) “မှတ်ပုံတင်အစားထိုး UID ကဒ်လုပ်သူတွေ များပြားလာ” <https://burmese.voanews.com/a/eid-smart-card-myanmar-immigration-unique-identification-number-uid/7621480.html>

public did not get the UID cards for fear of security concerns and the consequences of the system ([DVB 2024: April 4](#))¹⁴. Yet, the military threatens, and they do not issue the passports to the people without those smart cards. Moreover, the military inquired (more than necessary) and forced the public to use UID cards during domestic travels. Eventually, more people had to give in and get UID cards. Additionally, the military connected the biometric data from the AI-powered CCTV camera and those smart cards to track people's activities and resistance movements.

They detained the suspected civilians by tracking the IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) and IP (Internet Protocol) addresses of phone SIM cards through online transactions via KBZ Pay, AYA Pay, and Wave Money mobile applications. Moreover, those associated with these banking services have been sentenced under the Anti-Terrorism Law 50(J) and 52(A) (မိုးသောက် 2023: October 23)¹⁵. They closed the bank accounts of suspected individuals during the early period. However, they intentionally kept the bank accounts and online banking services active to closely monitor and track the accounts of those affiliated with them rather than closing these accounts later. They detained the exposed individuals along with the monitored account holders after a period of observation.

6. Townships where Internet and Telecommunication have been shut down (until as of November 2024)

Since the coup began, the military has banned freedom of expression and clearly violated digital rights. It has also cut off telecommunications both regionally and nationwide. As of November 2024, data from Athan shows that the military has cut off internet connections in 135 townships, representing over one-third of the nation.

¹⁴ DVB (2024, April 4) “Smart Card ပါမှ ပတ်စ်ပို့ ထုတ်ပေးမယ်ဆိုတာကြောင့် လဝကရုံးရှေ့ တန်းစီသူတွေ ရှိ” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BjMmRP7ogJ0>

¹⁵ မိုးသောက် (2024, October 23) “KBZPay ကြောင့် ဖမ်းဆီးထောင်ချခံရသူတွေရှိနေ (ရုပ်/သံ)” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-hdunG9T6Cs>

Current Situation in Chin



Both internet and communication channels have been shut down in the whole region of Chin State, and only some areas around Mindat can have limited access.

- All the phone lines and internet are shut down, including Wireless broadband
- There is no internet connection, but the phone lines are still working as usual
- In this case, all the phone lines are not available and at the same time, there is no internet connection but, Wireless broadband might be available at this time
- The Wireless broadband are not connectable

Current Situation in Kachin



It has been documented that almost all the townships in Kachin State have often experienced communication blackouts in 2024. Besides, it's been around five months since both the internet and communication have shut down in Kachin State currently.

Current Situation in Karenni



Internet and communication have been shut down in all the townships in the Karenni State since the military's attempted coup in 2021. Therefore, as an alternative, StarLink internet have become the main source for access to internet for people in this region.

Current Situation in Karen



- All the pphonelines and internetline are shut down, including Wireless boardband
- There is no internet connection, but the phonelines are still working as usualy
- In this case, all the phoneline are not available and at the same time, there is no internet connection but, Wirless boardband might me avaiabel at this time
- The Wireless boardband are not connetable

Access to the internet and communication services is limited in Myawaddy, with many areas of the region remaining inaccessible. In some parts of the region, residents can use Thai SIM cards (AIS - Mingalar Myanmar) as an alternative for communication.

Current Situation in Mon



Mon State's Ye township has been experiencing internet and communication blackouts for more than one year.

- All the pphonelines and internetline are shut down, including Wireless boardband
- There is no internet connection, but the phonelines are still working as usually
- In this case, all the phoneline are not available and at the same time, there is no internet connection but, Wireless boardband might me availabel at this time
- The Wireless boardband are not connetable


Current Situation in Rakhine



Since intensified fighting erupted again between the Arakan Army and the military, communication was cut off in the whole region of Rakhine State. Although it has been almost a year, no internet access was available. It is monitored that only (3) townships among (17) can sometimes have access to some of the communication channels.

have been disrupted since fighting broke out in Kyaukme at the beginning of the year. As a result of Operation 1027, which affected the distribution and flow of gas and fuel sources used for electricity, communications have also been cut off in areas controlled by the TNLA, such as Namhkam, Kutkai, and Namtu. Although residents in Lashio could access Mytel and MPT communication channels for a few days, these services have been unavailable since June 2024 and again since October.

Current Situation in Nay Pyi Taw



Due to flooding in September, some villages and areas in Nay Pyi Taw's Pyinmana have experienced the lost of internet and phone communication connection

Current Situation in Tanintharyi



All townships in the Tanintharyi region have been experiencing internet and communication blackouts. Although some areas in the region have begun to regain access to MPT, the service is often interrupted.


- All the pphonelines and internetline are shut down, including Wireless boardband
- There is no internet connection, but the phonelines are still working as usually
- In this case, all the phoneline are not available and at the same time, there is no internet connection but, Wireless boardband might me avallabel at this time
- The Wireless boardband are not connetable

Current Situation in Bago



Internet connection has been lost for over one year in most areas of the Bago region's Kyaukkyi and Kyauktaga. Likewise, the Yesagyo township has been experiencing communication blackouts for more than 16 months.


Current Situation in Ayeyarwady



The military has employed jumper devices around Pathein's city hall areas in the Ayeyarwady region, which has often disturbed the internet and communication.


- All the pphonelines and internetline are shut down, including Wireless boardband
- There is no internet connection, but the phonelines are still working as usually
- In this case, all the phoneline are not available and at the same time, there is no internet connection but, Wireless boardband might me availabel at this time
- The Wireless boardband are not connetable

Current Situation in Mandalay




Communication lines from MPT, Ooredoo, Mytel, and ATOM were cut off when fighting intensified in Mogoke in the third quarter of the year. It's also been noted that the military has shut down internet and phone communication in the Thabeikkyin township, but the cause of their action to shut down was unclear. Thabeikkyin township shares its borders with townships where fighting is intensified, such as Mogoke, Singu, and Tigyain; internet and communication have also been shut down in these townships. Moreover, as a consequence of intensified fighting and transportation has also been blocked, the food supply has been extremely limited. In addition, as fighting erupted near the area of Phin Oo Lwin, it was noted that communication channels, including phone and wifi, were unavailable to access.

Current Situation in Sagaing




The 28 townships out of the (17) townships of the Sagaging region are experiencing both internet and phone communication shutdowns. Only (9) townships as shown in this Sigaing region map can have access.

Current Situation in Magway




Internet and communication were cut off when fighting erupted in the western region of Magway in June 2024. People Defense Forces noted that the military intentionally carried out these acts of communication cut-off to prevent information flow among the people, significantly cutting off the information of military airstrikes and operations.



- In November, 135 townships experienced cuts to their phone line services and internet connectivity.
- In Kachin State, phone and internet services have been unavailable for four months, and residents still cannot access them.

The map shows the townships where internet lines were cut off until November 2024



Map data: USAID • Created with Datawrapper

7. The Causes of Communication Shut Down

One main reason for the breakdown of the internet and communication channels is the constant battles across the country. For instance, the battles between the military and the

Arakan Army¹⁶, the fighting between the Karen National Liberation Army¹⁷ and the military , the wars between the Kachin Independence Army¹⁸ and the military , and the battles between the People Defence Force (PDFs) and the military in the A Nyar (central) Regions of Sagaing and Magway have cut down the internet and communication channels.

Similar incidents can be seen in the Tainingtharyi Region, the Karreni State, the Chin State, the Mon State, and the Northern Shan State. The military military cut off the internet and phone lines, particularly in those areas where they carried out airstrikes and on-ground missions, sent rations to their battalion, and sent more troops to help the operations. Furthermore, the military military disrupted internet connections in cities by using jumpers to prevent drone threats from revolutionary forces.

One reason for losing internet connectivity and phone line services is the cutting off of electricity. Worse, Pyu-saw-thee, a militia group under the military , stole batteries from the service towers and resold the petroleum from the generators used at the towers when they were assigned to guard the service tower (Dawei Watch 2024: November 17)¹⁹. For those reasons, the internet and mobile connectivity are affected by insufficient electrical power from the receiving of electricity towers. The destruction of service towers across various states and regions after the coup also caused a loss of internet connectivity and phone services, as detailed in the Myanmar Internet Project Group’s report published in October ([Myanmar Internet Project](#) 2024: October)²⁰.

In addition, we have documented the cases of internet and communication blackouts due to natural disasters in 2024. Particularly in September 2024, thousands of civilians across

¹⁶ RFA Burmese (2024, October 15) “ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မှာ ဖုန်းနဲ့ အင်တာနက်လှိုင်းတွေ ပြတ်တောက်နေ” <https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/rakhine-phone-internet-cut-off-10152024024659.html>

¹⁷ DVB (2024, March 11) “သင်္ကန်းညီနောင်တွေ ဖုန်းလှိုင်းများ ဖြတ်ခံထားရပြီး ဒေသခံအချို့ မြို့တွင်းပိတ်မိနေ” <https://burmese.dvb.no/post/642631>

¹⁸ Kachin News Group (2024, July 22) “ကချင်ပြည်နယ်မှာ ဖုန်းနဲ့အင်တာနက်လှိုင်းတွေ ပြတ်တောက်” <https://burmese.kachinnews.com/2024/07/22/communication-cut-kachin/>

¹⁹ Dawei Watch (2024, November 17) “ပျူစောထီးများ ဖုန်းတာဝါတိုင်ဘတ္တရီဖြုတ်ရောင်းသဖြင့် ဘုတ်ပြင်းက ရွာအချို့တွင် ဖုန်းလှိုင်းလျှော့ပြတ်” <https://www.daweivatch.com/17/11/2024/101349/>

²⁰ Myanmar Internet Project (2024, October) “အင်တာနက်ဖြတ်တောက်မှုနှင့် အင်တာနက်ဆက်သွယ်ရေး အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများ ပျက်စီးမှုအခြေအနေအပေါ် လေ့လာချက်” https://www.myanmarinternet.info/my/post/blog_17_internet_infrastructure_shutdown

most townships in Myanmar suffered from flooding. For example, due to heavy fooling²¹ in September 2024, internet and communication were lost in Shan State’s cities, such as Tachileik²², Taunggyi, Shwenyaung, Nyaungshwe, and Kalaw (BBC Burmese 2024: September 14)²³. In addition, some regions of Bago also experienced the same due to flooding (နော်ဖူးဖူး 2023: October 9)²⁴. Even places like Naypyidaw, where most of the military leaders are based, experienced electricity and communication blackouts (Tachileik News Agency 2024: September)²⁵.

8. Some Cases of Local Media Coverage in 2024

- 1. The military limited access to digital platforms by shutting down telecommunication and internet connections.

“Phone line services are only available when they are operational. However, these services are often shut off. The MPT phone line is completely unavailable, while Telenor (now ATOM) can be used occasionally. In contrast, MyTel provides consistent access to both phone line services and Wi-Fi.”

- Ayeyarwaddy Times | 2024 March 3 | [Source](#)

- 2. The military blocked VPN software with the aim of blocking the information flow

“The military regularly is cutting down the communication of the public in the active conflict zones, as they are dealing with the nationwide guerrilla war of the pro-democracy

²¹ ရှမ်းသံတော်ဆင့် (2024, September 11) “တောင်ကြီးနှင့် ရန်ကုန်၊ မန္တလေး ကားလမ်းများ ပြတ်တောက်” <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=836926035213776&id=100066891622617&set=a.582750627297986>
²² မဲခေါင်သတင်း (2024၊ စက်တင်ဘာ၊ ၁၁) “စံချိန်တင်ရေကြီးနေတဲ့ တာချီလိတ်မှာ လျှပ်စစ်မီးပြတ်တောက်ပြီး ဖုန်းလိုင်းမကောင်းတာကြောင့် အများစုအဆက်အသွယ်ပြတ်နေ” <https://mekongnewsmm.com/ဒေသတွင်းသတင်း>
²³ BBC Burmese (2024, September 14) “စက်တင်ဘာ ၁၄ ရက် နိုင်ငံတဝန်း သတင်းအနှစ်ချုပ်- ကလေးမှာ လူ ၁၀၀ ကျော် ရုပ်အလောင်းတွေ၊ ၂၀၀ ကျော် ပျောက်ဆုံးနေ” <https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/c4gqdp9pggqo>
²⁴ နော်ဖူးဖူး (2023, October 9) “ပဲခူးမှာတစ်မြို့လုံးနီးပါး ရေနစ်မြုပ်နေတဲ့အပြင် ရေဘေးကယ်ဆယ်ရေးစခန်းတွေမှာပါ ရေဝင်ရောက်နေ” https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php/?story_fbid=649502837314986&id=100067658268690
²⁵ Tachileik News Agency (2024, September) “နေပြည်တော်တွင် ရေကြီးမှုကြောင့် လျှပ်စစ်မီးဖြတ်တောက်ထားပြီး ဖုန်းလိုင်းများလည်း ဆက်သွယ်ရခက်ခဲနေ” <https://www.facebook.com/TachileikNewsAgency/posts>

folks. This type of action is useful for strategies but can delay and challenge the spread of their crimes against humanity in public.

- Irrawaddy News | 2024 June 15 | [Source](#)

3. The military attempted to completely shut down social media sites primarily used by the people of Myanmar, which had already faced restrictions.

“The junta is completely violating freedom of speech, and now they have banned VPNs to prevent the use of Facebook. This is a tactic to cover their crimes.”

- Than Lwin Time | 2024 June 1 | [Source](#)

4. Some villages in BokePyin Township are experiencing internet connectivity issues because Pyu-Saw-Htee sold the batteries from the phone tower.

“One of the locals mentioned that the staff from the phone operators made repairs more than twice when the connections were lost due to stolen batteries. However, the pyu-saw-htee stole and resold the batteries, which led to the operators no longer coming to fix the issues.”

- Dawei Watch | 2024 November 17 | [Source](#)

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